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493 
NOTES 
Get Off My Porch: United States v. Carloss and the 
Escalating Dangers of “Knock and Talks”  
“[E]very man’s house is his castle.”1 This maxim is one of the oldest and 
most well-established principles in Anglo-American jurisprudence. In the 
United States, the maxim is embedded in the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, despite the continuing 
erosion of Fourth Amendment protections in public places.
2
 Citizens 
subject themselves to an ever-growing possibility of being searched when 
on the streets and sidewalks,
3
 traveling through airports,
4
 attending school,
5
 
or traveling in a car.
6
  
Nevertheless, the home remains the last bastion of personal privacy.
7
 But 
every time we open our home to guests or order a package from Amazon, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).  
 2. Both dissenting Justices and scholars have noted the continuing erosion of 
protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the “continuing evisceration 
of Fourth Amendment protections”); Wayne R. LaFave, Supreme Court Report: Nine Key 
Decisions Expand Authority to Search and Seize, 69 A.B.A. J. 1740, 1744 (1983); Silas J. 
Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 261 
(1984); John A. Hamilton, Comment, The United States Supreme Court's Erosion of Fourth 
Amendment Rights: The Trend Continues, 30 S.D. L. REV. 574, 574 (1985).  
 3. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (establishing reasonable suspicion as 
the standard for warrantless “stop and frisk” searches).  
 4. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697 (1983) (upholding warrantless 
detention of luggage based only on reasonable suspicion that it contained narcotics). 
 5. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656–57 (1995) (permitting 
suspicionless drug testing of public school students who participated in school’s athletic 
program); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–42 (1985) (applying reasonable 
suspicion standard to warrantless search of a student by school authorities).  
 6. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 (1983) (establishing 
reasonable suspicion standard for warrantless search of entire passenger compartment of an 
automobile).  
 7. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth 
Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”) (citation omitted); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 586 (1980) (noting that it has long been “a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law 
that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561 (“[T]he sanctity of 
private dwellings [is] ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment 
protection.”). 
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we implicitly invite strangers—salesmen, girl scouts, and even police 
officers—to park in our driveways, walk on our sidewalks, come onto our 
porches, and knock on our doors, exercising an understanding that a 
driveway and front door present an implicit invitation to those very visitors 
who wish to approach.
8
 Questions remain, however, as to how broadly 
courts should construe this implied license, and how a homeowner can 
revoke an implied invitation. Put another way, what measures are sufficient 
to inform the girl scout or police officer that she or he is not welcome on 
the property?  
In United States v. Carloss, the Tenth Circuit construed the implied 
license too broadly, holding that three “No Trespassing” signs posted 
around the yard adjoining a house and one on the home’s front door did not 
adequately inform the police officers that they were no longer invited onto 
the property to approach the home.
9
 Part I of this Note describes the history 
of “knock and talks” and their place within Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Part II discusses Carloss’s facts, holding, concurrence, and 
dissent. Part III demonstrates the dangers and unfavorable results that stem 
from the Tenth Circuit’s formulation and application of its Rule.10 Finally, 
Part IV briefly concludes. 
I. “Knock and Talks” and the Fourth Amendment 
Fourth Amendment doctrine has evolved throughout the history of the 
Supreme Court. For example, a “search” under the Fourth Amendment was 
originally tethered to common-law trespass and required an actual intrusion 
into a constitutionally protected area.
11
 In Katz v. United States, decided in 
1967, the Supreme Court seemingly abandoned its trespass-based analytical 
framework in favor of a test centered on a person’s reasonable expectation 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Police use the implied license to talk with a home’s resident as an investigative tool, 
which is referred to as a “knock and talk.” See United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 
1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006).  
 9. 818 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 231 (2016). Three signs were 
in the yard next to the driveway leading up to the defendant’s house, and one was placed on 
the front door. Id.  
 10. For the purposes of this Note, the rule that the Tenth Circuit applied to determine 
whether the implied license had been revoked will be referred to as “the Revocation Rule,” 
or simply “the Rule.”  
 11. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (“[W]ell into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.”); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that a non-trespassory wiretapping was not a search).  
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of privacy.
12
 But in 2012, the Court resurrected the trespass test in United 
States v. Jones, asserting that the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
test “has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory 
test.”13 Because two distinct tests now govern whether a Fourth 
Amendment violation has occurred, and courts may apply either or both, 
the trespass test’s resurrection has led to confusion and uncertainty. The 
resulting confusion is most evident when determining the government’s 
ability to conduct knock and talks and a citizen’s ability—or inability—to 
prevent them.  
The Fourth Amendment expressly extends its protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures to “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects.”14 Supreme Court jurisprudence ensures that Fourth Amendment 
protections are strongest when the “house” is involved, because “when it 
comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.”15 These 
protections extend to the “curtilage,” which is the “land immediately 
surrounding and associated with the home,” because the curtilage is 
“considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.”16 
Applying the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, the Supreme Court has 
explained that “[t]he protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a 
protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to 
the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations 
are most heightened.”17 Applying the trespass-based analytical framework, 
the Supreme Court has determined that a search “undoubtedly occur[s]” 
when the government, without a warrant, obtains information “by 
physically intruding” within the curtilage of a house.18 That is, a search 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overruling Olmstead, 277 U.S. 
438). The “reasonable expectation of privacy,” or Katz, test was actually formulated by 
Justice Harlan in his concurrence. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan’s 
formulation was later adopted as the benchmark test for privacy expectations in Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 13. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) (holding that tracking an 
automobile’s whereabouts using a physically mounted GPS tracker was a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).  
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 15. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 16. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). 
 17. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1986). 
 18. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6 (applying the Fourth Amendment’s trespass-based analytical 
framework in determining whether a search has occurred).  
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occurs unless a homeowner has explicitly or implicitly sanctioned the 
government’s physical intrusion into the constitutionally protected area.19  
At English common law, a person needed the homeowner’s express 
permission to enter a neighbor’s property.20 The more modern rule 
emanating from the Fourth Amendment, however, provides a license to 
enter another’s property which “may be implied from the habits of the 
country.”21 An implicit license in the United States typically permits a 
visitor “to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait 
briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.”22 
This implicit license to approach the front door extends to law enforcement 
officers, because courts consider an encounter with law enforcement to be 
no different than an encounter among private citizens.
23
 Moreover, “when 
the police come on to private property to conduct an investigation or for 
some other legitimate purpose
 
and restrict their movements to places 
visitors could be expected to go
 
(e.g., walkways,
 
driveways,
 
porches), 
observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth 
Amendment.”24 Regardless of whether the person knocking is a private 
citizen or a police officer, however, the homeowner has no obligation to 
open the door or speak to the person knocking.
25
  
Recently, in Florida v. Jardines, the primary case on which the Carloss 
court relied, the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional validity of 
knock and talks.
26
 There, two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
agents conducted a knock and talk after the Miami-Dade Police Department 
received a tip that someone was growing marijuana in Joelis Jardines’s 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See id. Of course, there are other circumstances where warrantless searches may be 
permitted, like the emergency aid or exigent circumstances exceptions.  
 20. Id. at 8.  
 21. Id. (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922)).  
 22. Id.  
 23. See id. (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)); United States v. 
Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) (“As commonly understood, a ‘knock 
and talk’ is a consensual encounter and therefore does not contravene the Fourth 
Amendment, even absent reasonable suspicion.”); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 
519 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Officers are allowed to knock on a residence’s door or otherwise 
approach the residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants just as any private citizen may.”).  
 24. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.3(f) (5th ed. 2016)) (footnotes omitted).  
 25. See King, 563 U.S. at 469–70 (“[W]hether the person who knocks on the door and 
requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no 
obligation to open the door or to speak.”).  
 26. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8.  
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home.
27
 The officers approached Jardines’s home with a drug-sniffing dog, 
which alerted the agents to the presence of contraband.
28
 Based on the alert, 
the officers obtained a search warrant and subsequently found marijuana 
plants.
29
 Jardines was arrested and charged with trafficking.
30
 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer whether the use of the 
drug-sniffing dog on Jardines’s porch constituted a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
31
 Asserting that the officers’ conduct 
was constitutional under the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test and 
relying on two similar cases, United States v. Place
32
 and Illinois v. 
Caballes,
33
 the State of Florida argued that the use of a drug-sniffing dog 
did not implicate any legitimate privacy interests.
34
 In rejecting this 
argument, the Court limited its analysis solely to Jones’s trespass theory, 
asserting that “[w]hen ‘the Government obtains information by physically 
intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects, ‘a “search” within the 
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’”35 
Maintaining there was “no doubt” that the officers entered the home’s 
curtilage, resulting in an investigation within a constitutionally protected 
area, the Court asserted that the next question was “whether it was 
accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion.”36  
At oral argument, Florida contended Jardines had conceded in the lower 
courts that the officers had a right to be on his front porch.
37
 The Supreme 
Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that 
using a drug dog was a “search” because the officers obtained information 
in a constitutionally protected area without the homeowner’s explicit or 
implicit consent.
38
 Justice Scalia characterized Jardines’ alleged concession 
that the State had a right to be on his front porch as “misstat[ing] the 
record” and emphasized that Jardines had “conceded nothing more than the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. at 3.  
 28. Id. at 4.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 5.  
 32. 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983) (holding that a canine inspection of luggage in an airport 
did not violate the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test). 
 33. 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (holding that a canine inspection of an automobile during 
a lawful traffic stop did not violate the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test). 
 34. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10.  
 35. Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)).  
 36. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).  
 37. Id. at 7 n.1. 
 38. Id. at 11-12. 
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unsurprising proposition that the officers could have lawfully approached 
his home to knock on the front door in hopes of speaking with him.”39 “Of 
course,” Justice Scalia wrote, “that is not what they did.”40 Instead, the 
officers introduced “a trained police dog to explore the area around the 
home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence.”41 According to 
Justice Scalia, “[t]here is no customary invitation to do that.”42  
An implied license to enter another’s property to knock on his or her 
door is not without limitation. Homeowners can prevent ordinary citizens 
and police officers alike from conducting a knock and talk by revoking the 
implied license. However, revocations are rare. Few citizens know that this 
implied license exists, and fewer still know what must be done to revoke it. 
Because the license arises from social custom and a “special form of 
consent by silence,” the homeowner bears the burden to demonstratively 
opt out of the habits of the country.
43
 Generally, albeit not uniformly, courts 
hold that a homeowner may revoke the implied license by “clear 
demonstrations”44 or “express orders,”45 which are “obvious to the casual 
visitor”46 and “unambiguous.”47 As was the case in Carloss, “No 
Trespassing” signs are routine sources of litigation, as courts must attempt 
to determine whether the signs have revoked the implied license.
48
  
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. at 7 n.1. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 9.  
 42. Id.  
 43. 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 106 (2d ed. 2016) (noting that implied 
licenses are limited by a homeowner’s ability, “at low cost, to express . . . dissent from the 
custom” by posting a sign forbidding entrance to the property).  
 44. E.g., State v. Grice, 767 S.E.2d 312, 319 (N.C. 2015) (noting that implied licenses 
“may be limited or rescinded by clear demonstrations by the homeowners and is already 
limited by our social customs”) (emphasis added). 
 45. E.g., Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964) (noting that there is 
no rule against approaching a home to speak with the occupants “[a]bsent express orders”) 
(emphasis added).  
 46. E.g., State v. Christensen, No. W2014-00931-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 2330185, at 
*8 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2015), aff’d, State v. Christensen, 517 S.W.3d 60 (Tenn. 
2017) (noting that “revocation must be obvious to the casual visitor who wishes only to 
contact the residents of a property”) (emphasis added). 
 47. E.g., State v. Howard, 315 P.3d 854, 860 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (emphasizing the 
homeowner did not revoke the implied license because the message to the public was not 
“unambiguous”).  
 48. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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II. United States v. Carloss 
A. Facts 
In Carloss, the United States prosecuted Ralph Carloss for drug and 
weapons offenses based on evidence obtained by two police officers as the 
result of a knock and talk.
49
 A federal agent received tips that Carloss, a 
convicted felon, was selling methamphetamine and was in possession of a 
firearm.
50
 To investigate, the federal agent and a local police investigator 
went to the home in which Carloss was staying to talk with him.
51
 Although 
there was not a fence or any other enclosure around the house or yard, there 
were four “No Trespassing” signs on the property—three in the yard and 
one on the front door.
52
 Despite the presence of these signs, the officers 
parked in the driveway, walked to the door, and knocked “for several 
minutes.”53 Although the officers heard movement inside, no one answered 
the door.
54
 A “short time later,” a woman emerged from the back door and 
met the two officers in the side yard.
55
 While the officers were explaining 
why they were there, Carloss exited the house and joined the woman and 
the officers in the side yard.
56
 After inquiring about who owned the home, 
the officers asked Carloss if they could search the house.
57
 Carloss 
responded that he would have to go inside to get “the man of the house,” 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 990–91.  
 50. Id. at 990.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. All of the signs were professionally printed with either yellow or orange words 
on a black background. Id. One “No Trespassing” sign was placed on a three-foot-high 
wooden post adjacent to the driveway on the side farthest from the house. Id. There was 
another sign tacked to a tree in the side yard. Id. Both of these signs contained the words 
“Private Property No Trespassing.” Id. Additionally, there was a sign on a wooden pole in 
the front yard next to the driveway closest to the house, and a sign on the front door of the 
house. Id. Both of these signs contained the words “Posted Private Property Hunting, 
Fishing, Trapping or Trespassing for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden Violators Will Be 
Prosecuted.” Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 990–91.  
 56. Id. at 991. The court noted that neither the woman nor Carloss pointed out the “No 
Trespassing” signs to the officers, nor did they ask the officers to leave the premises. Id.  
 57. Id.  
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Earnest Dry.
58
 When the officers asked if they could accompany Carloss 
inside the home, he allegedly replied, “Sure.”59  
Carloss and the officers entered the house and went into Carloss’s room, 
where the officers noticed drug paraphernalia and a white powder that 
appeared to be methamphetamine.
60
 When Mr. Dry entered the room, the 
officers requested his permission to search the house.
61
 After calling his 
attorney, Dry asked the officers to leave, and they complied with the 
request.
62
 Relying on their observations of the drug paraphernalia and white 
powder, the officers obtained a search warrant, which led to the discovery 
of multiple methamphetamine labs, additional drug paraphernalia, and a 
loaded shotgun.
63
 Based on this evidence, Carloss and Dry were 
prosecuted.
64
 After the district court denied Carloss’s motion to suppress 
the evidence found in the house, Carloss conditionally pled guilty to 
conspiring to possess pseudoephedrine pending appeal of the district court’s 
denial of his motion to suppress.
65
 Carloss was sentenced to forty-nine 
months in prison.
66
 
B. Issue  
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Carloss contended that the search of his 
home was illegal because the underlying warrant was based on information 
the officers obtained while violating the Fourth Amendment.
67
 According to 
Carloss, the violation occurred when the officers entered the curtilage of his 
home to conduct the knock and talk because the four “No Trespassing” 
signs had revoked the officers’ implied license to approach his home and 
knock on the door.
68
 Additionally, Carloss argued that the officers exceeded 
the scope of their implied license by knocking at his door too long
69
 and 
that his consent to the search was involuntary.
70
 Thus, the Tenth Circuit was 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. Although Dry was identified as the owner, Dry’s mother was the actual owner. 
Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 992.  
 68. Id. at 994.  
 69. Id. at 997–98.  
 70. Id. at 998. 
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faced with three issues: (1) whether the “No Trespassing” signs revoked the 
implied license required to conduct the knock and talk; (2) if the implied 
license had not been revoked, whether the officers exceeded the scope of 
the license; and (3) whether Carloss’s consent to the search was 
involuntary.
71
  
C. Majority Decision  
In considering whether the four “No Trespassing” signs revoked the 
officers’ implied license, the Tenth Circuit confined its analysis to Jones’s 
resurrected trespass theory.
72
 After expounding Tenth Circuit knock-and-
talk jurisprudence, the court turned its focus to Florida v. Jardines,
73
 
emphasizing that the case did not alter prior law upholding knock and 
talks.
74
 Basing its reasoning on the Jardines Court’s validation of knock 
and talks, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Carloss’s “No Trespassing” 
signs did not revoke the officers’ implied license.75 In doing so, the court 
emphasized that a knock and talk is not a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.
76
  
The court then distinguished the case at bar from Jardines, asserting that 
Jardines did not actually involve a knock and talk because the “officers 
approached the front door of a home, not seeking a consensual knock-and-
talk, but instead specifically to conduct a search from the porch.”77 Unlike 
Jardines, there was “nothing in this record to suggest that the officers 
conducted, or intended to conduct, a search from the front porch when they 
went onto the front porch to knock on Carloss’s front door.”78 Moreover, 
unlike Jardines, the officers did not “discover any incriminating evidence 
while they were on the front porch knocking.”79  
                                                                                                                 
 71. See id. at 997–98.  
 72. Id. at 992 n.2 (“Carloss expressly bases his argument solely on the trespass theory of 
Fourth Amendment protections and we, therefore, confine our analysis to that theory.”). 
 73. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) 
 74. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 992.  
 75. Id. at 995. 
 76. Id. at 993 (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9 n.4) (“Jardines reiterated that a knock-
and-talk itself is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes: ‘[I]t is not a Fourth 
Amendment search to approach the home in order to speak with the occupant, because all 
are invited to do that. The mere purpose of discovering information in the course of 
engaging in that permitted conduct does not cause it to violate the Fourth Amendment.’”).  
 77. Id. at 992–93.  
 78. Id. at 993.  
 79. Id.  
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But the Tenth Circuit arrived at this conclusion only by finding that the 
implied license to access Carloss’s curtilage and approach his home had not 
been revoked.
80
 In rejecting Carloss’s claim that the implied license had 
been revoked, the majority adopted a case-by-case rule (the “Revocation 
Rule”) under which revocation “depends on the context in which a member 
of the public, or an officer seeking to conduct a knock-and-talk, 
encountered the signs and the message that those signs would have 
conveyed to an objective officer, or member of the public, under the 
circumstances.”81 Applying the Revocation Rule, the court focused on the 
physical placement of each of Carloss’s signs. The court held that the three 
signs in the yard and along the driveway would not have conveyed to an 
objective officer that the license had been revoked, because they were 
located in “open fields,” which are not constitutionally protected areas.82 
Additionally, the court held that the sign on the front door was 
“ambiguous” and therefore “did not clearly revoke the implied license.”83 
Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the officers did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because the “objective officer” would not have 
understood that the implied license to conduct a knock and talk had been 
revoked.
84
  
D. Concurrence  
Although Chief Judge Timothy Tymkovich concurred with the majority, 
his analysis differed: “A Fourth Amendment physical-intrusion case poses a 
twofold question: (1) whether police intruded without license into a 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at 997. Without finding the existence of an implied license and Carloss’s lack of 
revocation, a search would have “undoubtedly occurred,” because the officers would have 
been physically intruding into a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain 
information. 
 81. Id. at 994. 
 82. Id. at 995. Additionally, the court noted that it was Carloss’s burden to establish 
what was included in the home’s curtilage, and that Carloss did not expressly claim that 
these areas were part of the home’s curtilage. Id. 
 83. Id. at 996.  
 84. Id. at 997. The Tenth Circuit also addressed Carloss’s arguments that the officers 
exceeded the scope of their implied license by knocking at the door too long and that his 
consent was the product of the Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 997–98. In response to 
his contention that the officers exceeded the scope of the implied license, the court declined 
“to place a specific time limit on how long a person can knock before exceeding the scope of 
this implied license.” Id. at 998. In response to Carloss’s contention that his consent was 
based off of a Fourth Amendment violation, the court held that the “district court’s finding 
that Carloss voluntarily consented to the officers accompanying him into the house was not 
clearly erroneous,” because “there was no such Fourth Amendment violation.” Id. at 998–99.  
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constitutionally protected area, and (2) whether they obtained information 
via that intrusion.”85 Because the homeowner bears the burden of revoking 
the license by showing that he has opted out of the country’s habits, Judge 
Tymkovich contended that the majority should have applied a different test: 
[T]he court must deploy an objective test, asking whether a 
reasonable person would conclude that entry onto the curtilage—
the front porch here—by police or others was categorically 
barred. In other words, we look to each case’s facts to determine 
whether the reasonable person would think the license had been 
revoked. And the question presented by this case is whether “No 
Trespassing” signs in the circumstances here communicates a 
categorical bar that is clear that no one would step on the front 
porch. In my view, this is a question of context: the time, place, 
manner, and circumstance of the encounter.
86
 
Considering the context, Chief Judge Tymkovich agreed with the majority 
that Carloss failed to show that the implied license had been revoked, but 
emphasized that, in “a residential context, the intention of the homeowner 
who posts signs, without more, seems inadequate to revoke the license.”87 
Noting that it was not his view “that a ‘No Trespassing’ sign will never 
indicate the revocation of the implied license,”88 Chief Judge Tymkovich 
offered examples of additional measures that would be sufficient to do so, 
suggesting that a “closed or locked gate,” a “fence,” or some “other 
physical obstacle,” in the “residential context” would likely be sufficient.89 
Here, because no additional measures clarified that the license had been 
revoked, the first prong was not satisfied, and therefore no Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred.
90
 
E. Dissent  
Judge Neil Gorsuch, now an Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court, dissented. Judge Gorsuch noted that the government 
asserted two theories advocating that the officers’ conduct was 
constitutional, and that, despite the majority and concurrence rejecting both 
theories, the court chose to instead produce its own theories to resolve the 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 1001 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).  
 86. Id. at 999. 
 87. Id. at 1000.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 999–1000.  
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case.
91
 The first argument advanced by the government and subsequently 
dismissed by the court was that police officers have “an irrevocable right to 
enter a home’s curtilage to conduct a knock and talk” because a knock and 
talk is “an investigative technique approved by the Supreme Court.”92 Judge 
Gorsuch noted that under this theory, a homeowner “may post as many No 
Trespassing signs as she wishes. She might add a wall or a medieval-style 
moat, too. Maybe razor wire and battlements and mantraps besides. Even 
that isn’t enough to revoke the state’s right to enter.”93 Judge Gorsuch 
dismissed this argument, saying, “[n]ot one of the members of this court 
accepts it. In fact, neither of my colleagues’ opinions even dignifies it with 
discussion.”94  
Next, Judge Gorsuch examined the government’s second argument, that 
“a homeowner may avoid a knock and talk only by hiding in the home and 
refusing to answer the door,” or “maybe, as the government seemed to 
concede at oral argument, by opening the door and commanding officers to 
leave.”95 Noting that this argument was “no more persuasive than the last,” 
Judge Gorsuch asserted it was actually “no different from the last.”96 
Rejecting the government’s second argument, Judge Gorsuch asserted that a 
“homeowner who refuses to answer the door, or who opens it to say ‘go 
away,’ does so after the officers have already entered the home’s front 
porch and knocked on the door—everything the implied license permits the 
officers to do.”97  
Judge Gorsuch then criticized the concurring opinion, arguing that it is 
“a pretty rare day when we pursue an argument for a party that the party has 
so avidly disowned.”98 Additionally, he continued, the cases the 
concurrence cited were inapplicable because they applied only to “open 
fields.”99 Moreover, Judge Gorsuch argued that the concurrence offered no 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. at 1004 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 1007.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 1009 (asserting that not only did the government fail to present an argument 
similar to the concurrence’s theory, it expressly disavowed that theory by “telling us 
repeatedly that walls and fences (yes, even moats) cannot keep its agents from entering the 
curtilage to conduct a knock and talk”).  
 99. Id.  
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valid authority, resting “predominantly on certain intuitions about what 
‘reasonable people’ think.”100  
Turning his focus next to the majority opinion, Judge Gorsuch criticized 
the court’s decision to analyze the signs separately, which, in his opinion, 
led the court to reach the wrong conclusion.
101
 The majority regarded the 
three signs in the yard incorrectly; it was in conflict with the authorities it 
relied on, yet “discusses none of them.”102 Moreover, “the only cases it does 
cite stand simply for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment is 
inapplicable to open fields.”103  
According to Judge Gorsuch, the majority also incorrectly interpreted the 
sign on the front door. This argument is primarily based on the conflict 
inherent in the court’s conclusion that the sign was “ambiguous” even 
though the sign’s express language forbid “TRESPASSING FOR ANY 
PURPOSE”—a notion that was “especially” true when considering that 
there was “no evidence in the record that any hunting, fishing, or trapping 
took place in the yard of this home in the middle of town along a paved 
street.”104 Calling the outcome a “paradox,” Judge Gorsuch summarized the 
majority opinion, saying it stood for the proposition that “No Trespassing” 
signs revoke the license only when “they (1) are placed visibly on the 
curtilage itself and (2) don’t contain surplus language about hunting and 
trapping.”105 
III. Analysis  
The Tenth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Carloss is problematic 
for two reasons. First, the court’s formulation of the Revocation Rule rests 
on weak authority, fails to consider the relevance of common law and 
statutory trespass into the curtilage of a home, and ignores considerable 
authority supporting a “No Trespassing” sign’s ability to revoke an implied 
license. Moreover, the holding may lead to a series of dangerous and 
unfavorable results.  
Second, the Tenth Circuit improperly applied the Rule because it failed 
to properly consider the totality of the circumstances. The court erroneously 
dismissed the three signs in the yard based on their legal inability to prevent 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 1010.  
 101. Id. at 1012–13.  
 102. Id. at 1013.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 1013–14.  
 105. Id. at 1014. 
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trespass into “open fields,” despite the officers’ entry into the home’s 
curtilage, and then proceeded to dismiss the sign on the front door by 
determining that it was “ambiguous,” despite its express language 
prohibiting trespass “for any purpose.”  
A. Formulation of the Revocation Rule 
The Revocation Rule hangs its hat on weak authority, relying on two 
cases that have distinguishable facts and involve separate and distinct issues 
from Carloss. Both cases, State v. Christensen,
106
 an unpublished 
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals decision from 2015, and State v. 
Hiebert,
107
 an Idaho Supreme Court case from 2014, came from outside the 
court’s jurisdiction and are merely persuasive. The Carloss court’s reliance 
on these cases is troubling for several reasons.  
For one, the court’s reliance on these cases is puzzling because neither 
Christensen nor Hiebert seem to persuade other jurisdictions. The Tenth 
Circuit is only one of three courts to cite to Christensen and one of three 
courts to cite to Hiebert. Moreover, in its search for authority, the Tenth 
Circuit limited its examination of case law to post-Jardines cases despite its 
explicit assertion that “Jardines did not change our prior law upholding 
knock-and-talks.”108 Nevertheless, the court said, “Carloss has not cited, nor 
can we find, any post-Jardines authority holding that a resident can revoke 
the implied license to approach his home and knock on the front door 
simply by posting a ‘No Trespassing’ sign.”109 It seems contradictory to say 
on one hand that Jardines did not change prior law while on the other 
rejecting any pre-Jardines authority on “No Trespassing” signs and knock 
and talks.  
Further, both Christensen and Hiebert involve questions that are separate 
and distinct from those in Carloss. Unlike the court in Carloss, the courts in 
both cases limited their Fourth Amendment analysis to the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test, which is independent of Jones’s trespass-based 
test.
110
 The Carloss court relies on Christensen’s assertion that the 
“emerging rule appears to be that the implied invitation of the front door 
                                                                                                                 
 106. No. W2014-00931-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 2330185, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 
14, 2015), aff’d, 517 S.W.3d 60 (Tenn. 2017).  
 107. 329 P.3d 1085, 1090 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). 
 108. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 992.  
 109. Id. at 995.  
 110. See id. at 992 n.2 (“Carloss expressly bases his argument solely on the trespass 
theory of Fourth Amendment protections and we, therefore, confine our analysis to that 
theory.”).  
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can be revoked but that the revocation must be obvious to the casual visitor 
who wishes only to contact the residents of a property.”111 But this assertion 
immediately follows an extensive consideration of case law supporting the 
proposition that the “vast majority” of cases consider “No Trespassing” 
signs when determining “whether a person has demonstrated a legitimate 
expectation of privacy.”112 Notably, and unlike the Tenth Circuit, the 
Christensen court omitted any substantial consideration of Jones or its 
trespass theory.
113
 In Hiebert, the court specifically addressed the 
defendant’s argument that officers had “violated his reasonable expectation 
of privacy by entering into the junk yard portion of his property.”114 The 
Hiebert court also omitted any substantial consideration of Jones or the 
trespass theory, instead asserting that “there can be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy as to observations made” during use of an implied 
license.
115
  
Hiebert and Christensen are also factually distinguishable from Carloss. 
For example, unlike Carloss, the defendant in Hiebert did not contest the 
police’s entry into his home or curtilage. Rather, Hiebert involved officers 
entering a junkyard which, in addition to being a residence, was open to the 
public for business purposes.
116
 As the court noted, “the expectation of what 
an ordinary visitor (in many cases, a customer of the business) might 
reasonably do is expanded,” creating “an implied—if not explicit—
invitation” to enter the junkyard.117 Moreover, the single “No Trespassing” 
sign was not easily visible due to its “obscure placement” on a shed outside 
the curtilage, and the officers entered the property during business hours 
through a gate bearing an “open” sign on it.118 Whatever message “No 
Trespassing” signs communicated under these circumstances is 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. at 994–95 (citing Christensen, 2015 WL 2330185, at *8).  
 112. Christensen, 2015 WL 2330185, at *7. The court cites thirteen cases, each of which 
considers “No Trespassing” signs in light of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. See 
id.  
 113. The court does not cite Jones; admittedly, though, it refers to “the Jardines search 
test.” See id. at *5, *8 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–12 (2013)). But this 
reference was briefly discussed and subsequently dismissed after the court improperly 
characterized it as a test that “focuses more on trespass law than on expectation of privacy,” 
instead of recognizing it as a separate and distinct test. See id.  
 114. State v. Hiebert, 329 P.3d 1085, 1088 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014).  
 115. Id. at 1091.  
 116. Id. at 1089. 
 117. Id. at 1089–90 (emphasis added).  
 118. Id. at 1087-88, 1090–91, 1091 n.4. 
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substantially different than the message communicated in the present case, 
especially when applying a different Fourth Amendment privacy test.  
In addition to these problems, the Tenth Circuit also erroneously denied 
the relevance of common law and statutory trespass to entry into the 
curtilage, instead limiting its focus to entry into open fields. According to 
the court, the signs leading up to Carloss’s home would not have conveyed 
to an objective officer or member of the public that he or she could not 
conduct a knock and talk, because “No Trespassing” signs “will not prevent 
an officer from entering privately owned ‘open fields.’”119 The court noted 
that police may enter open fields even if the entry would be a trespass at 
common law, because “in the case of open fields, the general rights of 
property protected by the common law of trespass have little or no 
relevance to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.”120 The court also 
noted that police may enter open fields even if the entry might have 
violated Oklahoma statutory law, citing a case holding that “officers did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment when they made observations from a 
defendant’s open field, even though the officers, in entering the open field, 
violated Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1835.”121  
Although the court was correct in its assertion that common law and 
statutory trespass do not prevent officers from entering open fields, it 
incorrectly extended this premise to the curtilage. Trespass has “little or no 
relevance to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment”—but only “in the 
case of open fields.”122 Contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s holding, both 
common law and statutory trespass are relevant when officers enter the 
curtilage, because unlike an open field, which is not a constitutionally 
protected area, the front porch is afforded the most stringent Fourth 
Amendment protection.
123
  
The court also ignored a considerable amount of authority supporting a 
“No Trespassing” sign’s ability to revoke an implied license. While the 
Fourth Amendment does not “incorporate” state statutes,124 a great deal of 
authority suggests that the common law at the time of the founding did not 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 995.  
 120. Id. at 996 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183–84).  
 121. Id. (citing United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2003)).  
 122. See id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  
 123. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 (2013) (noting that the front porch of a home 
is “the classic exemplar” of curtilage).  
 124. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 169 (2008) (“No early case or commentary, to 
our knowledge, suggested the Amendment was intended to incorporate subsequently enacted 
statutes.”).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/5
2018]       NOTES 509 
 
 
require a homeowner to revoke a license in any particular way. Rather, 
“express words . . . [or] an act . . . indicating an intention to revoke” were 
sufficient.
125
 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that a 
homeowner may prevent visitors from entering his or her property to knock 
at the front door “by notice or order.”126 In determining what kind of 
“notice” is sufficient for revocation of the license, the Breard Court cited 
“trespass after warning” statutes, seemingly recognizing a “No 
Trespassing” sign’s ability to prevent unwanted guests from approaching 
the home.
127
 Additionally, most state legislatures have enacted laws 
providing that entry after notice—specifically “No Trespassing” signs—
will support criminal trespass actions.
128
 It is counterintuitive that police 
officers are permitted to conduct a knock and talk because “they do no 
more than any private citizen might do,”129 yet a private citizen can be held 
criminally liable for the same action. This notion holds especially true when 
considering that a single “No Trespassing” sign does the trick when used by 
the government.
130
  
The court’s Rule also leads to a series of dangerous and unfavorable 
results. First, the practical effect of the Tenth Circuit’s complicated context-
based rule is the creation of a de facto permanent easement for police 
officers to approach the front door of a home to “consensually” talk with 
the homeowner—because most homeowners do not know an implied 
license exists, and fewer know how to revoke it.  
The potential for a de facto permanent easement is illustrated by the 
arguments advanced by the government in Carloss. In its opening brief, the 
government suggested that the police have an irrevocable right to enter a 
                                                                                                                 
 125. 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 836 (Basil Jones, ed., 3d ed. 
1939).  
 126. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951) (emphasis added). Notably, 
Jardines relies on Breard. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8 (citing Breard, 341 U.S. at 626).  
 127. See Breard, 341 U.S. at 626 n.2 (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 
147 n.10 (1943)).  
 128. See, e.g., 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1835 (2011) (endorsing the use of “NO 
TRESPASSING” or “similar signs”); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 
21.2 (2d ed. 2003) (citing and collecting state statutes).  
 129. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011).  
 130. See State v. Christensen, No. W2014-00931-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 2330185, at 
*12 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2015), aff’d, 517 S.W.3d 60 (Tenn. 2017) (Williams, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The federal [or state] government can put up a 
single “No Trespassing” sign on a fence at a nuclear facility or an abandoned munitions 
facility, and a trespass there upon is a trespass . . . . If governments can use a single sign so 
effectively against citizens, why then can not citizens use a sign equally against 
governments?”). 
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home’s curtilage to conduct a knock and talk.131 The government asserted 
an additional theory, arguing that even if a license existed, a homeowner 
may only avoid a knock and talk by refusing to open the door or by opening 
the door and requesting that the officers leave.
132
 But as Judge Gorsuch 
pointed out, a homeowner who refuses to open the door or asks the officers 
to leave “does so after the officers have already entered the home’s front 
porch and knocked on the door—everything the implied license permits the 
officers to do.”133 The government’s argument implies the existence of a de 
facto permanent easement because, following the government’s logic, a 
homeowner cannot revoke the license. Rather, the homeowner may merely 
limit it by refusing to answer the door or telling the officers to go away—
but only after the officers have used the license to enter the curtilage.  
Second, the Revocation Rule also creates an unworkable precedent for 
both police officers and homeowners. The Rule requires a court to make 
fact-specific, case-by-case determinations, leading to the inability of both 
police and citizens to know before an encounter whether an implied license 
has been revoked. This area necessitates clear rules for police to follow in 
order to determine whether their actions will violate the Constitution.
134
 
Under the court’s case-by-case approach, police must conjecture as to the 
legal conclusion that a reviewing court may make before conducting a 
knock and talk. Specifically, police must decide whether a homeowner has 
taken sufficient measures to revoke the license—determinations that remain 
uncertain and inconsistent in courts across America—such as whether the 
homeowner erected a high enough fence or posted a sufficient number of 
“No Trespassing” signs.135 As the Supreme Court has said, whether the 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 12–15, United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988 
(10th Cir. 2016) (No. 13-7082) (failing to address any available method of revocation and 
applying the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test). 
 132. Id. at 17-18; see Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1007 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
government “seemed to concede at oral argument” that a homeowner may be able to avoid a 
knock and talk by opening the door and requesting that the officers leave).  
 133. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1007 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 134. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (“Often enough, the 
Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the 
object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear 
and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months 
and years after an arrest or search is made.”).  
 135. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (citing New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454, 458 (1981)). The Oliver Court asserted that case-by-case approaches to determine 
Fourth Amendment violations are unfavorable, because “police officers would have to guess 
before every search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently high, posted a 
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officer’s actions would be consistent with the Fourth Amendment “would 
turn on ‘[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, 
ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline 
distinctions.’”136 Thus, the Rule creates an unworkable precedent for police 
officers, because it makes it difficult for officers to discern the scope of 
their authority, creating “a danger that constitutional rights will be 
arbitrarily and inequitably enforced.”137  
Similarly, homeowners deserve to know whether the measures they have 
taken sufficiently revoke the implied license.
138
 The Rule’s case-by-case 
approach provides little of the direction or notice homeowners need in order 
to know whether the implied license has been revoked. If four standard, 
store-bought “No Trespassing” signs139 are insufficient to revoke the 
implied license, what must a homeowner do to actually revoke the license? 
Judge Gorsuch snidely suggests the following sign:  
THE IMPLIED LICENSE DISCUSSED BY THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT IN BREARD v. ALEXANDRIA, 
341 U.S. 622 (1951) AND FLORIDA v. JARDINES, 133 S. Ct. 
1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) IS HEREBY REVOKED.
140
  
Although this sign would (hopefully) suffice, the establishment of such a 
high standard remains problematic. The average citizen—and arguably 
even the average law professor who does not specialize in the Fourth 
Amendment—does not have the knowledge necessary to meet this standard 
and revoke the license. This high standard led Judge Gorsuch to wonder 
whether the Rule would “do no more than invite a new cottage industry, 
one spitting out lawn signs with long and lawyerly (and no doubt less 
intuitive and commonsensical) messages instead of the tried and true ‘No 
Trespassing.’”141  
Unsurprisingly, the niche-industry Judge Gorsuch envisioned has come 
to fruition. Two law professors now sell “LAWn Signs,” which mirror 
                                                                                                                 
sufficient number of warning signs, or located contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to 
establish a right of privacy.” Id. 
 136. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 458).  
 137. See id. at 181–82 (citation omitted). 
 138. United States v. Holmes, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2015). 
 139. Again, three signs were in the yard lining the driveway leading up to the house 
where any visitor would see them, and one was in the middle of the front door, expressly 
stating “Trespassing for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden.” United States v. Carloss, 818 
F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 2016).  
 140. Id. at 1012.  
 141. Id.  
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Judge Gorsuch’s suggestion and explicitly revoke the implied license.142 
The professors behind the signs collaboratively authored a law review 
article to raise awareness of the implied license and teach the average 
citizen how to revoke it.
143
 The professor’s “LAWn Signs” serve as further 
evidence that the Tenth Circuit’s Rule created an unworkable precedent for 
homeowners who do not know whether the implied license has been 
revoked. 
Finally, the Revocation Rule threatens to further diminish the Fourth 
Amendment protections afforded to the home and its curtilage. When 
combined with other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement,
144
 the knock and talk becomes a compelling investigative tool 
for police. The technique, however, has the potential to be abused, and 
therefore has the potential to substantially limit Fourth Amendment 
protections bestowed to the home. For example, because it requires no level 
of suspicion whatsoever, the knock and talk provides a mechanism for 
police to circumvent arrest and search warrant requirements.
145
 Most often, 
police use knock and talks when they suspect criminal activity within a 
home but lack probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
146
 As the former 
Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court said, “[A] knock and talk is 
used to obtain consent by none too subtle intimidation, which further 
illustrates that it is not simply being used to ask questions at the door as 
anyone might do.”147 And, as Judge Gorsuch noted, the potential for abuse 
is large when no level of suspicion is required: “Because everything 
happens with the homeowner’s consent, the theory goes, a warrant isn’t 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See FOURTH AMENDMENT SECURITY, https://fourthamendmentsecurity.com/ (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2017). In addition to yard signs, the website sells other merchandise 
attempting to protect Fourth Amendment rights, including bumper stickers, luggage tags, 
and t-shirts. Id.  
 143. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Stephen E. Henderson, Lawn Signs: A Fourth 
Amendment for Constitutional Curmudgeons, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 494 (2016).  
 144. For example, exigent circumstances, consent, the “plain view” doctrine, and 
searches incident to arrest. 
 145. See Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 
1099, 1104 (2009) (“Police use ‘knock and talk[s]’ to gain access to a home without a search 
warrant by getting the occupant to consent to entry and search, to arrest without a warrant, to 
gather further evidence of a suspected crime, or to dispel such suspicion.”). 
 146. See id. (noting that a knock and talk is “a technique employed with calculation to 
the homes of people suspected of crimes”).  
 147. Jim Hannah, Forgotten Law and Judicial Duty, 70 ALB. L. REV. 829, 837 (2007); 
see Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011) (justifying knock and talks because “[w]hen 
law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no 
more than any private citizen might do”). 
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needed. . . . But in the constant competition between constable and quarry, 
officers sometimes use knock and talks in ways that test the boundaries of 
the consent on which they depend.”148 Thus, knock and talks carry great 
potential to erode Fourth Amendment protections of the home, because 
homeowners do not know how to revoke the license and because the police 
continue to test the boundaries of consent—often without limitation. 
B. Application of the Revocation Rule 
In its application of the Revocation Rule, the Tenth Circuit failed to 
sufficiently consider the totality of the circumstances. Rejecting both the 
government’s and Carloss’s arguments, the court advanced its own legal 
theory—a theory “the district court never passed upon and the government 
never presented.”149 In doing so, the court ignored the fact that all of the 
elements necessary to establish a “search” were present. It was undisputed, 
and the government conceded, that the officers physically entered the 
home’s curtilage when they stepped on Carloss’s front porch, that the 
officers entered the curtilage to obtain information, and that the officers 
acted without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or the homeowner’s 
express consent.
150
 Thus, the entirety of the case turned on the existence of 
the implied license, which in turn depended on whether Carloss sufficiently 
revoked his implicit consent. Without the license, the government’s 
physical intrusion would have amounted to a “search” within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.
151
 Analyzing the three signs in the yard 
separately from the sign on the front door, the court failed to sufficiently 
consider the totality of the circumstances, concluding that the signs would 
not have conveyed to an objective officer that the license had been 
revoked.
152
 To the contrary, a proper consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances is more consistent with revocation. 
In applying its context-based Rule, the majority conveniently 
compartmentalized the signs for the purpose of its analysis. The court 
                                                                                                                 
 148. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 1003 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting).  
 149. Id. at 1013 (arguing that the majority’s theory is not “so obviously correct” that “we 
might confidently dispense with the adversarial process and adopt it without bothering to 
hear from the parties or district court”). 
 150. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 131, at *17. 
 151. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (“The Government 
physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no 
doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).  
 152. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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considered the three signs aligning Carloss’s driveway separately from the 
sign placed on Carloss’s front door. The majority erroneously dismissed the 
first three “No Trespassing” signs, asserting the signs “would not have 
conveyed to an objective officer, or member of the public,” that the license 
had been revoked.
153
 The court’s dismissal of these signs was improper, 
because it based its reasoning on the signs’ location—outside the 
curtilage—maintaining that “No Trespassing” signs “will not prevent an 
officer from entering privately owned ‘open fields.’”154 The cases the 
majority cites to support this proposition, Rieck v. Jensen
155
 and Oliver v. 
United States,
156
 hold that the Fourth Amendment’s protections do not 
extend to open fields, but they have no bearing on intrusions into the 
curtilage. Indeed, the cases do not address whether “No Trespassing” 
signs—although placed in open fields—can adequately communicate to an 
objective officer or member of the public that entry into the curtilage is 
prohibited.
157
  
Next, the majority addressed the sign on the front door of the house.
158
 
Again, the court found this “No Trespassing” sign insufficient to revoke the 
implied license, reasoning that the sign was “ambiguous” because it 
prohibited activities that ordinarily do not take place within the curtilage.
159
 
Asserting that the sign “could have simply been reiterating that such 
recreational activities would not be allowed on the property generally,”160 
the court maintained that the message did not “clearly and unambiguously 
tell the mail carrier, pizza deliverer, or police officer that they cannot knock 
on the front door seeking a consensual conversation with those who live 
there.”161  
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. at 995. 
 154. Id. (citations omitted).  
 155. 651 F.3d 1188, 1189, 1191–94 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 156. 466 U.S. 170, 182–83 (1984).  
 157. In Rieck, the Tenth Circuit held that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred 
when a deputy sheriff entered private property by opening a closed gate with a “No 
Trespassing” sign. 651 F.3d at 1189. But unlike the case at hand, the Rieck court was 
confronted with an officer’s entry into an open field—not curtilage. Id. at 1192. Similarly, 
Oliver was not concerned with a constitutionally protected area, but merely stands for the 
proposition that it is “not generally true that fences or ‘No Trespassing’ signs effectively bar 
the public from viewing open fields in rural areas.” 466 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added).  
 158. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 990. Specifically, the sign stated, “Posted Private Property 
Hunting, Fishing, Trapping or Trespassing for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden Violators 
Will Be Prosecuted.” Id.  
 159. Id. at 996.  
 160. Id. at 996–97.  
 161. Id. at 997. 
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The majority’s determination that the sign was ambiguous is 
unwarranted for two reasons. First, law enforcement officials are 
distinguishable from mail carriers and pizza deliverers, because, unlike 
police officers, most mail carriers and other delivery services do not need to 
make use of an implied license. Instead, a homeowner expressly invites 
them onto the property by ordering a package or a pizza. It would have 
been more appropriate for the Tenth Circuit to characterize police officers 
as the Ninth Circuit did in Davis v. United States, where the court 
analogized police officers to pollsters or door-to-door salesmen.
162
 Unlike 
mailmen or pizza deliverers, pollsters, salesmen, and police officers are 
virtually never expressly invited guests.  
Moreover, the court cited no authority supporting its notion that 
revocation for one is revocation for all. A homeowner should have the 
ability to revoke the implied license, prohibiting entry by all unless 
expressly invited.
163
 Such a revocation would only affect certain persons—
those who need the implied license to enter the property—because a 
mailman or pizza deliverer has no need for an implied license when a 
homeowner has expressly invited them onto the property. 
The second problem with the majority’s application is that the 
determination that the sign was “ambiguous” directly conflicted with both 
the express language of and the circumstances surrounding the sign. The 
court maintained that the sign, on its face, did not appear to be directed at 
people desiring to speak with the homeowner, because the sign “referenced 
activities that ordinarily do not take place within a home or its curtilage—
hunting, fishing, and trapping.”164 But these activities do not ordinarily take 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964), overruled by United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 
F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2012). As one court put it, “Davis is the seminal case announcing the 
rationale underlying the knock and talk doctrine.” United States v. Holmes, 143 F. Supp. 3d 
1252, 1265 n.18 (M.D. Fla. 2015); see also Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951) 
(noting that the implied license justifies ingress to the home by “solicitors, hawkers[,] and 
peddlers”). The same logic applies to the government’s characterization, which likened 
police officers to “postal carriers, FedEx couriers, flower delivery persons, [and] the 
paperboy.” See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 131, at *19.  
 163. See FOURTH AMENDMENT SECURITY, supra note 142 (offering a lawn sign revoking 
the implied license for certain groups of people, but not others: “I hereby REVOKE ALL 
IMPLIED LICENSES to enter or approach my home. Girl Scouts, Delivery, and Friends: 
Welcome! For-Profit Solicitors: Stay Out! Law Enforcement: Stay Out!”).  
 164. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 996–97.  
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place within the “middle” of town, either.165 Moreover, the court’s 
conclusion is enigmatic in that it suggests that additional language 
(regarding hunting fishing, and trapping) detracts from a sign’s principal 
warning—“Trespassing for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden.”166  
A proper consideration of the totality of the circumstances should have 
indicated revocation—especially considering the number of the signs,167 the 
fact the door knocker was replaced with a sign, and the express language on 
the sign within the curtilage. Moreover, the court failed to offer any 
evidence of the habits of the country. The court maintained that, taken 
together, all four signs “would not have conveyed to an objective officer 
that he could not go to the front door and knock.”168 But despite its 
assertion that the license to conduct a knock and talk is “implied from the 
habits of the country,”169 the majority failed to offer any evidence 
whatsoever supporting its conclusory assertions regarding what an objective 
officer or member of the public would have understood. Nor did the 
concurrence offer any evidence to support what Judge Gorsuch calls its 
“intuition about social customs.”170 According to Judge Gorsuch, the 
“opposite intuition seems no less and maybe a good deal more 
defensible.”171  
The opposite intuition is indeed more defensible, especially in light of 
the Supreme Court’s use of the “knocker” as a justification for knock and 
talks. “In accordance [with] the habits of the country, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that ‘the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation 
or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, 
hawkers[,] and peddlers of all kinds.’”172 But in Carloss, not only was the 
knocker absent, it was replaced with a sign prohibiting trespassing “for Any 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. at 990. Notably, there was no evidence in the record that any hunting, fishing, or 
trapping took place “in the yard of this home in the middle of town along a paved street.” Id. 
at 1014 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
  166. Id. at 996–97. 
 167. Judge Gorsuch makes the argument that a large number of “No Trespassing” signs, 
“collectively and strategically placed,” should have the same effect as other additional 
measures, such as a fence. Id. at 1011 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. at 995.  
 169. Id. at 994.  
 170. Id. at 1011 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 171. Id.  
 172. United States v. Jones, No. 4:13CR00011-003, 2013 WL 4678229, at *6 (W.D. Va. 
Aug. 30, 2013) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (citing Breard v. 
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951)).  
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Purpose.”173 Therefore, the totality of the circumstances warranted a 
different conclusion. To enter the home’s front porch, a visitor would have 
to disregard four separate, explicit warnings that his or her presence was 
unequivocally unwelcome. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Tenth Circuit’s holding in Carloss is problematic due to the court’s 
formulation and application of the Revocation Rule. The Rule is based on 
weak authority, relying on dissimilar cases that applied the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test rather than Jones’s trespass test. It also fails to 
consider the relevance of common law and statutory trespass into the 
curtilage, and it ignores a considerable amount of authority supporting a 
“No Trespassing” sign’s ability to revoke an implied license. Finally, the 
Rule essentially creates a de facto permanent easement and sets an 
unworkable precedent for both police officers and homeowners.  
In addition to these problems with the formulation of the Rule, the Tenth 
Circuit improperly applied it by failing to consider the totality of the 
circumstances. The court dismissed the signs in the yard by mistakenly 
relying on case law supporting the general rule that “No Trespassing” signs 
do not prevent trespass into open fields. The court dismissed the sign on the 
front door by finding it “ambiguous,” despite its express language 
prohibiting trespass “for any purpose.” Contrary to the court’s holding, a 
proper consideration of the totality of the circumstances in Carloss 
indicates revocation of the implied license. In neglecting to appropriately 
formulate or apply the Revocation Rule, the Tenth Circuit set a dangerous 
precedent—escalating the dangers of knock and talks and eroding the 
Fourth Amendment privacy protections afforded to the home and its 
curtilage.  
 
Skyler K. Sikes 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 990 (emphasis added).  
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